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1. INTRODUCTION
A motorist, without warning, is suddenly involved in an automobile accident
that results in serious bodily injury or property damage. Convinced the accident
is entirely the other driver's fault, the motorist ascertains whether the other driver
is insured. If the injured motorist is lucky, the other driver will have automobile
liability insurance.' The motorist is confident the other driver's coverage will
be inadequate to cover all of the damages. A settlement for the limits of the
other driver's liability coverage occurs, which releases the other driver and his
insurer. The injured motorist then seeks to recover the perceived excess damages
from his insurance company through his underinsured motorist (UM) coverage.2
The injured motorist's insurer evaluates the claim and offers money to the
insured, the injured motorist, below an amount the insured feels is justified. The
insured accepts the money, but is not obligated to release his insurance company.
Confident a jury will agree with him and award more damages, the insured
initiates suit against his UM insurer. A jury determines the insured sustained
damages in an amount less than he had already received from the other driver's
liability insurer. Therefore, the injured party's UM insurer does not owe
additional damages to the insured, and the insured's suit is dismissed.
What happens to the money the injured party accepted from his UM insurer?
The insurance company did not receive a release from liability for this amount.
A jury determined the tortfeasor's insurance company adequately compensated
the injured party, and that excess insurance, underinsured motorist coverage, was
Copyright 1994, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
t. Automobile liability insurance coverage. with minimum requirements, became compulsory
for all drivers in Louisiana in 1977. However, not all drivers comply with this requirement. "The
state Department of Motor Vehicles estimated that at least 22 percent-or 648,029-Louisiana
motorists were uninsured on Feb. 1, 1992." Mukul Venna, Auto Insurance Prompts Bills:
Legislators Concerned About Rising Cost, Decreasing Availability, Baton Rouge Morning Advocate,
March 29, 1992. at A 10.
2. Prior to 1977, automobile liability insurance in Louisiana was not compulsory. Proof
of financial responsibility was required only after the motorist had been involved in an
accident. Many innocent accident victims, although insured against their own liability,
were left uncompensated because the negligent motorist was uninsured and not financially
responsible. Recognizing this serious gap in protection, the legislature, in 1962, required
insurers to make uninsured motorist (UM) insurance protection available in certain minimal
limits to persons purchasing automobile liability insurance. Through legislative andjudicial
expansion, UM coverage has become a very significant protection for insured Louisiana
motorists and a fertile field for litigation.
W. Shelby McKenzie, Louisiana Uninsured Motorist Coverage-After Twenty Years, 43 La. L. Rev.
691, 691 (1983).
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not needed to make the victim whole. Arguably, the UM insurer should be
entitled to a return of the funds given to the insured before the trial. The money
was an estimate, by the UM insurer, of the insured's damages that may exceed
the amount the insured already received from the tortfeasor's insurer.
To answer this question regarding Louisiana law, the inquiry begins with the
recent Louisiana Supreme Court decision, State Fann Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Azhar.3 After an analysis of facts very similar to the example
above, the Azhar court, in a 4-3 decision, held the insurance company was not
entitled to a return of the tender. The supreme court decision implies that
tenders have finality,4 respecting payments to the insured, only for the UM
insurance company. However, the UM insurer does not have the same sense of
finality, regarding liability, until a court so determines or the insured chooses not
to pursue future litigation.
Chief Justice Calogero, in dissent, joined by Justices Kimball and Marcus,
appeared to follow the majority of prior jurisprudence addressing this issue. His
opinion was concise and clear s But, more importantly, Chief Justice Calogero's
evaluation was tempered by fairness to both sides.
Instead of using the hypothetical above, a more complete understanding of
the significance the Azhar decision will have on the Louisiana insurance industry
should result from examining the actual facts of Azhar.
II. HISTORY OF AZHAR
On May 11, 1987, Dr. Azhar was involved in an automobile accident with
Shannon Holmes.6 At the time of the accident, State Farm Mutual Automobile
3. 620 So. 2d 1158 (La. 1993).
4. This implication follows from the court's holding that the tender will not be returned absent
some fraud or ill practices. Therefore, once an insurer makes the tender, the best case scenario for
the insurer, if a trial results, is finding no additional liability to the insured.
5. What McDill v. Utica Mist. his. Co.. referred to as an unconditional tender is not a final
or conclusive payment, but one without such condition as, say, requiring a release of
limitation on the use of the funds. Nor is it an accord and satisfaction, compromise or
settlement. And it does not effect a release of the claim when the insured accepts the
tender. As the court of appeal decided in United Senices Auto Ass'n v. Dugas, the
tendered sum is not conclusively the insured's as the amount due for uninsured damages,
until a judge or jury says it is.
Since the "unconditional tender" is only a good faith act acknowledging a UM insurer's
contractual obligation to pay damages, when an insurer pays more than the underinsured
damages, or what is required by contract, then an insurer has a right to recover from its
insured for mistaken or excessive payments not due under the contract ... since an
insured can seek more money, even after the tender, fairness dictates that the law operate
for a defendant as well as a plaintiff, and permit a defendant to seek restoration of
reimbursement of an excessive payment.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Azhar. 620 So. 2d 1158, 1160 (La. 1993) (Calogero, C.J..
dissenting) (citations omitted).
6. Brief for Respondent at I, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Azhar, 620 So. 2d 1158 (La.
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Insurance Company (State Farm) was both Ms. Holmes' liability insurer and Dr.
Azhar's underinsured motorist insurer.7 Dr. Azhar filed suit against Ms. Holmes
and State Farm, as both Ms. Holmes' liability insurer and as Dr. Azhar's
uninsured motorist carrier.8 Dr. Azhar released Ms. Holmes and State Farm, in
its capacity as her liability insurer, from liability after State Farm paid its liability
policy limits of $25,000." On December 18, 1990, Dr. Azhar received $35,000
from State Farm under the uninsured/underinsured motorist provisions of Azhar's
policy with State Farm."°
Dr. Azhar continued to pursue the litigation against State Farm in hopes of
receiving a larger payment under his policy. At trial, the jury awarded damages
of only $28,600, assigned 50% of the fault to Dr. Azhar, and, therefore, reduced
his recovery to $14,300." Ultimately, the insurance payments to Dr. Azhar
exceeded his assessed damages; thus, Azhar's suit against State Farm was
dismissed.' 2 These insurance payments to Dr. Azhar included $25,000 from
Ms. Holmes' insurer, $35,000 from Dr. Azhar's uninsured/underinsured motorist
insurer, and $1,926 from the medical payments provision of State Farm's policy
with Dr. Azhar. 3 The sum of these credits, $61,926, was over four times the
amount to which the jury decided Dr. Azhar was entitled.
State Farm demanded from Dr. Azhar the return of the $35,000 tender
because the damages awarded to him by the jury did not exceed the limits of Ms.
Holmes' $25,000 liability policy. 4 After Dr. Azhar refused to return the
$35,000 payment, State Farm filed suit to recover this amount. Its theory of
recovery was that it had paid Dr. Azhar a "thing not due,"" and that he had
been unjustly enriched by receiving the $35,000.16
The supreme court in Azhar held that an "unconditional tender" made by an
insurer is not recoverable, absent some fraud or ill practices.'7 The supreme
court set forth several bases which lay the foundation for its decision. These
underlying conclusions include: (1) "If the legislature had intended for the
'unconditional' payment under LSA-R.S. 22:658 to be subject to a 'condition,'










15. La. Civ. Code arts. 2301-2313. See discussion infra part IV.E.
16. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Azhar, 620 So. 2d 1158 (La. 1993).
17. Id. at 1160. The trial court denied Dr. Azhar's exception of no cause of action, and the
court of appeal denied a writ, citing United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Dugas. 593 So. 2d 918 (La. App.
4th Cir.). writ denied, 596 So. 2d 210 (1992). A supervisory writ was granted. 616 So. 2d 676 (La.
1993), to review the action of the court of appeal. AzJar, 620 So. 2d at 1158-59.
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'condition' in the statute[;]' ' 8 (2) the use of the word "unconditional," regarding
a tender, absolutely bars any condition, regardless of its source, which will
retroactively affect the tender; and (3) Louisiana Civil Code article 2308' 9
means "a conditional payment may be reclaimed ... [but] an unconditional
payment may not be reclaimed." 20  This note will analyze the underlying
support of Azhar in an attempt to determine if the Louisiana Supreme Court
reacted too harshly by rejecting State Farm's request.
This note will also address the issue of whether an insurer providing
uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage is entitled to recover its unconditional-
ly tendered payment from the insured if a court awards damages less than the
amount tendered.2 While addressing this issue, this note suggests that despite
the supreme court's conclusion in Azhar, the insurer should be able to recover
the unconditional tender. To support this suggestion, this note will address the
following specific issues: (1) the insured is not legally entitled to collect because
the suspensive condition, existing in all underinsured motorist insurance
contracts, is never fulfilled, preventing the insurer's obligation from coming into
existence; (2) the unconditional tender made by State Farm is in fact a payment
of a thing not due and subject to recovery; (3) the court misinterpreted Louisiana
Civil Code article 2308, leading to an incorrect application regarding an
agreement subject to a suspensive condition; (4) an unconditional tender does not
become conditional because a legal mandate, beyond the control of the insurer,
is imposed by law; and (5) policy considerations, which include the specific
purpose of UM coverage, the insured's minimal risks in pursuing future
litigation, and the future effect on the size of the insurer's tender, require the
opposite result.
Section III of this note addresses the purpose of uninsured/underinsured
motorist coverage in Louisiana. Section IV analyzes the applicable law in
Louisiana. This analysis reviews Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:658 and 22:1406
along with the jurisprudential decisions that affect the interpretation of these
statutes. Section V examines the policy considerations triggered in the insured
and UM insurer relationship. Finally, section VI suggests a statutory solution to
address the unconditional tender recovery, an area of the law that has been
previously unprovided for by the legislature.
18. Id. at 1159 (citing United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Dugas, 593 So. 2d 918 (La. App. 4th Cir.)
(Hufft, J. Pro Tern., dissenting), writ denied, 596 So. 2d 210 (1992)).
19. La. Civ. Code an. 2308 addresses payments under agreements (a contract in the instant
case) that are subject to an uncertain suspensive condition (insured's damages exceeding the
underinsured's liability coverage limits).
20. Azhar, 620 So. 2d at 1160.
21. Additionally, it should be recognized that the judicially determined damages were less than
the tortfeasor's liability policy limits.
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IIl. PURPOSE OF UNINSURED/UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
Uninsured (UM) and underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage is similar to, but
is not, strictly. speaking, a substitute liability policy obligating the UMIUIM
insurance company to compensate the insured for the negligence or fault of an
inadequately insured motorist.2 Though there are many similarities between
UM/UIM insurance, underinsured motorist coverage developed independently,
and much later, to fill the gaps between loss and compensation that resulted in
early jurisprudence interpreting the extent and meaning of "uninsured motorist
coverage."
Uninsured motorist insurance did not develop until the 1950's.23 UM
insurance became necessary due to the increased number of persons failing to
acquire the necessary liability insurance. Insurance companies, although
sympathetic to the victims of an uninsured motorist, generally opposed state-
imposed programs and public Unsatisfied Judgment Funds. To avoid further
"socialization of insurance" and government intervention, the National Bureau
of Casualty Underwriters and the Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau drafted an
uninsured motorist endorsement to the family automobile policy. 24 The rapid
adoption and public acceptance of uninsured motorist coverage in the insurance
industry resulted in its implementation throughout the nation on a broad scale. 25
The purpose of UM insurance is to provide the insured with the same
protection he would have had were the offending driver covered adequately withliability insurance. 26 UM insurance was designed to be secondary insurance,
only necessary if sufficient liability insurance, the primary insurance, was
unavailable. Therefore, UM insurance is designed to place the victim in the
same position as he would have been had the tortfeasor been insured. 27 The
required coverage is not to be extended, by judicial interpretation, beyond the
statute's plain intent.28 The plain intent of Louisiana Revised Statutes
22:1406(D), the basis for UM coverage, does not include double recovery or
22. This is not to say that uninsured motorist coverage is for the benefit or protection of the
tortfeasor (uninsured motorist). The UM carrier's payment of the insured's damages does not release
the tortfeasor from any liability. The insurer under this coverage merely stands in the shoes of the
tortfeasor to compensate the victim for the amount the victim could have collected had the tortfeasor
(uninsured motorist) carried liability insurance. See Rowland H. Long, The Law of Liability
Insurance § 24.01 (1988).
23. Robert H. Joost, Automobile Insurance and No-Fault Law 2d § 1:10 (1992); Long, supra
note 22, § 24.01.
24. Long, supra note 22, § 24.01.
25. Id.
26. Booth v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 253 La. 521, 218 So. 2d 580 (1968); 8C John A.
Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 5071.45 (1987); George J. Couch et al., Couch Cyclopedia
of Insurance Law § 45:624 (2d ed. 1981); Long, supra note 22. § 24.01.
27. See Block v. Reliance Ins. Co., 433 So. 2d 1040 (La. 1983); Hoelly v. Government
Employees Ins. Co., 418 So. 2d 575 (La. 1982).
28. Smith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 328 So. 2d 679 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
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placing the insured in a better position than he would have been had the
tortfeasor carried sufficient liability insurance. "Underinsured motorists coverage
pays damages for bodily injury that the covered persons are legally entitled to
recover from a motorist who has auto liability insurance, when the amount of
that insurance is not enough to pay the full amount of the damages." 29
Uninsured/Underinsured motorist coverage was designed to compliment
standard liability policies. It must be recognized that UM is closer to an accident
or indemnity policy, as compared to simply another liability policy available to
the innocent victim. One reason is because UM provides first-party benefits as
opposed to a liability policy that pays third-party benefits.3' Although Louisi-
ana courts have found that insufficient liability insurance by a motorist
constitutes "uninsured,'01 some jurisdictions determined otherwise. 32  Thus,
underinsured motorist coverage was usually created in those jurisdictions to fill
some of the gaps created by this strict construction.
The Legislature designed underinsured motorist coverage to deal with
situations where the insured was injured by a tortfeasor who, although carrying
the statutory minimum in liability coverage, was insufficiently insured to
compensate fully for all damages incurred. In a traditional sense, the above
tortfeasor was not "uninsured" because some liability coverage was available to
the victim. Underinsured motorist coverage filled the possible void in coverage
by providing benefits equal to the difference between the tortfeasor's liability
insurance limits and the victim's liability limits. The additional benefits were
available only if the victim's limits were higher than the tortfeasor's, and then
only to the extent necessary to fully compensate the victim.-4 "UIM insurance,
like UM coverage, provides damages to an insured only if another person's fault
was the proximate cause of the insured's injury, and only if the damages of the
insured/victim exceeded the liability limits of the defendant's [tortfeasor's] ..
liability policy.
5
The history and application of UIM and UM coverage should be considered
within an analysis of Azhar. With an understanding of UIM and UM coverage,
29. Frederick G. Crane, Insurance Principles and Practices 86 (1980) (emphasis added).
30. Couch et al., supra note 26, § 45:624.
31. See Whitten v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 353 So. 2d 1071 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977).
32. Other jurisdictions have denied recovery under "uninsured" coverage. The distinction is
based in the general definition of uninsured. These other jurisdictions determined if the tortfeasor
had insurance, but it was insufficient, the tonfeasor was "underinsured" not "uninsured." After
finding the tortfeasor was not uninsured, recovery of any damages above the torifeasor's liability
limits Would be denied. See Payne v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 768 S.W.2d 543 (Ark. 1989);
Cossitt v. Federated Guar. Mut. Ins. Co., 541 So. 2d 436 (Miss. 1989); Harwell v. Continental Ins.
Co., 359 S.E.2d 172 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
33. This is not to imply that uninsured motorist coverage is a form of no-fault coverage.
Recovery by the innocent victim is still conditioned upon a finding of tort liability on the part of the
uninsured tortfeasor. See Long, supra note 22, § 24.01.
34. Joost, supra note 23, § 1:11.
35. Id. (emphasis added).
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it is apparent that the essential function of underinsured motorist coverage
supports State Farm's conclusion that its payment should be returned because Dr.
Azhar received a payment of a thing not due.36
IV. ANALYSIS OF APPLICABLE LOUISIANA LAW
A. Louisiana Statutes and Jurisprudence Establishing the Requirements of the
Administration of Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Coverage
In Louisiana, "[ulninsured motorist coverage received its initial legislative
endorsement in Act 187 of 1962, which amended Louisiana Revised Statutes
22:1406 to add subsection (D). '37  Subsection (D) provided that Louisiana
insurers could not issue an automobile liability insurance policy unless protection
was provided for persons insured under the liability policy for bodily injury
damages for which an owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle was
legally responsible.38 Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:1406(D) remains the basis
for uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage. 9 The courts of Louisiana have
consistently determined that the object of Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:1406(D)
is to promote full recovery of damages to innocent victims by making uninsured
motorist coverage available as primary protection when the tortfeasor is without
coverage (uninsured) and, additionally, as excess coverage when the tort-feasor
is inadequately insured (underinsured).40
Another crucial statute in the analysis of a claim involving underinsured
motorist insurance is Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:658 ,4 which establishes the
36. La. Civ. Code art. 2301 provides: 'He who receives what is not due to him, whether he
receives it through error or knowingly, obliges himself to restore it to him from whom he has unduly
received it."
37. McKenzie, supra note 2, at 691.
38. Id. The amount of protection was established in the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility
Law. See La. R.S. 32:851-1043 (1989 & Stipp. 1994).
39. See La. R.S. 22:1406(D) (Supp. 1993).
40. Johnson v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 425 So. 2d 224, 226 (La. 1982) ("The central purpose
of... the uninsured motorist statute is the protection of the injured person."); Hoefly v. Government
Employees Ins. Co., 418 So. 2d 575, 578 (La. 1982) ("rhe statute [La. R.S. 22:1406(D)] is to be
liberally construed to carry out this objective."). See W. Shelby McKenzie & H. Alston Johnson, IlI,
Insurance Law and Practice § 119. in 15 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1986). An uninsured
motorist's insurer is responsible for the damages suffered by an insured which are in excess of the
liability insurance of the negligent motorist and which have not been paid by the negligent motorist
or by someone responsible for his fault or by someone solidarily liable with him.
41. La. R.S. 22:658 (Supp. 1994) provides:
A. (I) All insurers issuing any type of contract, other than those specified in R.S. 22:656
[life], R.S. 22:657 [health and accident], and Chapter 10 of Title 23 of the Louisiana
Revised Statutes of 1950, shall pay the amount of any claim due any insured within thirty
days after receipt of satisfactory proofs of loss from the insured or any party in interest.
B. (1) Failure to make such payment within thirty days after receipt of such satisfactory
written proofs and demand therefor ... when such failure is found to be arbitrary,
19941 1749
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thirty-day42 time frame for insurers to pay any amount due to the insured. This
thirty-day period does not limit the investigation of genuine questions of fact to
be resolved. The UM insurer may proceed as long as necessary to resolve
legitimate concerns. However, once the UM insurer has sufficient reason to
believe it will owe the insured some amount, it then has thirty days in which to
make the necessary tender.4 3
Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:658 was enacted prior to Louisiana Revised
Statutes 22:1406(D). This time sequence created a legal concern of whether
Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:658 was applicable to uninsured/underinsured
motorist coverage. The Louisiana Supreme Court eliminated this uncertainty in
Hart v. Allstate Insurance Co.:"
La. R.S. 22:658 provides that all insurers issuing "any type" of
"contract" other than life insurance and health and accident insurance
shall pay the amount of any claim due any insured. Uninsured motorist
coverage is a contract whereby the insurer agrees to pay all sums which
the insured shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the
owner or operator of an uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle
because of "bodily injury" sustained by the insured, caused by accident
and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such uninsured
or underinsured motor vehicle. Accordingly, La. R.S. 22:658 is
applicable to an uninsured motorist claim.s
The Hart court then proceeded to analyze the two statutes, Louisiana
Revised Statutes 22:658 and 22:1406(D), in pari inateria to determine the
meaning of two vital clauses contained within them. The first clause, "legally
entitled to recover," as contained in Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:1406(D),
meant "simply that the plaintiff must be able to establish fault on the part of the
uninsured motorist which gives rise to damages and prove the extent of those
damages. 46 The court then stated:
capricious, or without probable cause, shall subject the insurer to a penalty, in addition
to the amount of the loss, of ten percent damages on the amount found to be due from the
insurer to the insured, or one thousand dollars, whichever is greater, payable to the
insured, or to any of said employees, together with all reasonable attorney fees for the
prosecution and collection of such loss. or in the event a partial payment or tender has
been made, ten percent of the difference between the amount paid or tendered and the
amount found to be due and all reasonable attorney fees for the prosecution and collection
of such amount.
42. Prior to the 1989 amendment to La. R.S. 22:658. the period allowed for payment of claims
was sixty days. The 1989 amendment became effective for all claims arising after midnight,
December 31, 1989.
43. William D. Grimley, The Unconditional Tender: McDill Revisited, Around the Bar, Apr.
1990, at 6, 9.
44. 437 So. 2d 823 (La. 1983).
45. Id. at 827.
46. Id. at 828 (citing Booth v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 253 La. 521. 218 So. 2d 580 (1969)).
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Accordingly, to establish a "satisfactory proof of loss" [contained in
Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:658] of an uninsured motorist claim, the
insured must establish that the insurer receive sufficient facts which
fully apprise the insurer that the owner or operator of the other vehicle
involved in the accident was [1] uninsured or underinsured, [2] that he
was at fault, [3] that such fault gave rise to damages and [4] establish
the extent of those damages.47
The second clause, "shall pay the amount of any claim due," has become
equally important. Interestingly, the word "unconditional" is not contained in
Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:658. Frequently, the unconditional tender becomes
a central aspect of uninsured/underinsured claims. So, what is the statutory basis
for the unconditional tender? The statutory language, "shall pay the amount of
any claim due," found in Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:658, must be the basis
for the unconditional tender.
The development of an unconditional tender requirement is credited by
recent courts to McDill v. Utica Mutual hisutrance Co.48 The Louisiana
Supreme Court, in McDill, expounded on the rule it established in Hart:
If the first three elements of the Hart test are satisfied and the insured
has made a showing that the [UM] insurer will be liable for some
general damages, the [UM] insurer must tender the reasonable amount
which is due. This amount would be unconditionally tendered to the
plaintiff not in settlement of the case, but to show their good faith in the
matter and to comply with the duties imposed upon them under their
contract of insurance with the insured. The amount that is due would
be a figure over which reasonable minds could not differ.49
This position is taken by the court because allowing the defendant-insurer to
refuse tendering any amount because the exact amount of damages, the fourth
element of Hart test, is not proven, renders the fourth element "meaningless as
it places an impossible burden on the plaintiff prior to going to trial." Thus,
the unconditional tender was born ... or was it?"'
47. Id. at 828.
48. 475 So. 2d 1085 (La. 1985).
49. Id. at 1091-92 (emphasis added).
50. Id. at 1091.
51. Actually, no, it was not. Prior to the Louisiana Supreme Court's 1985 decision in McDill,
Louisiana courts were already using the concept of an unconditional tender in the application of
Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:658. See. e.g., O'Brian v. Allstate Ins. Co., 420 So. 2d 1222 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1982): LeBlanc v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London. 402 So. 2d 292 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981);
Nations v. Excess Ins. Co.. 377 So. 2d 433 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979); Riverland Oil Mill v.
Underwriters for Lloyd's, New York, 368 So. 2d 156 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 369 So. 2d
1365 (La. 1979); Fruge v. Hub City Iron Works, Inc., 131 So. 2d 593 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
Three years before McDill, the third circuit stated: "The law is clear that where there is a
reasonable dispute as to amount of loss, the insurer can avoid imposition of penalties and attorney's
19941 1751
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Regardless of its origin, the "unconditional tender" and the recovery of an
overpayment, resulting from an "unconditional tender," have created conflict
within Louisiana's judicial system. To address the overpayment problem, an
examination of the prior decisions is beneficial.
B. Prior hiconsistent Decisions
Prior to Azhar, Louisiana jurisprudence was split on the issue whether an
insurer was entitled to recover the excess of an unconditional tender if the
subsequent award of damages was less than the amount tendered."2 The issue
also has been interpreted, under Louisiana law, by a federal court." A brief
analysis of these cases follows.
The first case addressing an underinsured motorist insurer's right of
recovery, Gallagher v. State Farm hIsurance Co.,s4 arose in federal court. The
facts of Gallagher, regarding the status of the insurers, were very similar to
Azhar." Gallagher settled her claim against an underinsured motorist and State
Farm for $10,000, the limits of the liability policy. 6 Additionally, on July 24,
1990, State Farm sent Gallagher a $6,500 check, specifically described as an
unconditional tender.. 7 As the litigation continued, State Farm removed the
action to federal court to resolve Gallagher's claim against it as her underinsured
motorist carrier.58 Gallagher filed an amended petition"9 to which State Farm
filed an answer and a counterclaim that sought reimbursement of the $6,500
tender.6° Judge Sear held in Gallagher: "While the amount the insurer must
tender is that which cannot reasonably be disputed, the terms by which McDill
fees by unconditionally tendering part of the claim which is undisputed." O'Brian, 420 So. 2d at
1225. However, because McDill was the first Louisiana Supreme Court decision to adopt the
"unconditional tender" language, citation to it, naturally, is more authoritative than citation to an
appellate decision. This example is simply to demonstrate that the lower courts were familiar with
the term, "unconditional tender," and had used it prior to MeDill.
52. Pitard v. Davis, 599 So. 2d 398 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1992) (finding an insurer is not entitled
to recovery of payment); United Servs. Auto. Assoc. v. Dugas, 593 So. 2d 918 (La. App. 4th Cir.),
writ denied, 596 So. 2d 210 (1992) (finding an insurer is entitled to recovery of payment).
53. Gallagher v. State Farm Ins. Co., 760.F. Stipp. 562 (E.D. La. 1991) (finding an insurer may
recover tendered amount exceeding damages).
54. 760 F. Supp. 562 (E.D. La. 1991).
55. In both accidents State Farm was the liability insurer of the tnderinsured motorist and was
the underinsured motorist insurer of the injured party.
56. Gallagher, 760 F. Supp. at 563.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. The amended petition also sought attorney's fees from State Farm by alleging State Farm's
actions were arbitrary and capricious. While this is a vital aspect of the requirements of La. R.S.
22:658, this note does not attempt to address the issue of attorney's fees. except as it affects the
insurer's motive for making an uncottditional tender.
60. Gallagher, 760 F. Supp. at 563.
1752 [Vol. 54
NOTES
describes the tender it requires do not admit of the conclusion that the insurer is
forbidden from arguing later that a tender it made was excessive or mistaken.'
The first Louisiana circuit case to specifically address the issue of the return
of an unconditional tender was United Services Automobile Ass'n v. Dugas,6'
which cited Gallagher approvingly.63 In Dugas, the plaintiff, Dr. Dugas, and
an underinsured motorist were involved in an automobile accident. United
Services Automobile Association (USAA), as the insurer of Dr. Dugas, provided
liability and underinsured motorist coverage. Dr. Dugas sued the underinsured
motorist, her insurer, and his insurer, USAA, claiming the negligent third party
was underinsured as to his damages.' The defendant's insurer paid its policy
limits of $20,000, and Dr. Dugas dismissed his suit against the defendant and her
insurer.6' The litigation against USAA continued on the issue of USAA's
underinsured coverage of Dr. Dugas.' Before the trial actually commenced,
pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:658 and McDill, USAA uncondition-
ally tendered $110,000, which Dr. Dugas accepted.67 The case then proceeded
to a trial against USAA because the damages Dr. Dugas claimed exceeded the
$130,000 already received. However, the jury awarded damages of only
$60,000-$70,000 less than the amount received by Dr. Dugas. 6  USAA filed
suit to recover the $70,000; the court of appeal ultimately ruled in its favor."
A significant piece of the puzzle, which is relied upon by subsequent
courts, 70 also originated in this opinion. In dissent, Justice Pro Tempore Hufft
61. Id. at 564.
62. 593 So. 2d 918 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 596 So. 2d 210 (1992).
63. Id. at 921.





69. Originally, in the district court, the insured filed exceptions of res judicata. estoppel by
judgment, no cause of action, and motion for summary judgment. The insurer filed only a motion
for summary judgment. The district court denied all exceptions and denied both motions for
summary judgment. The insured filed application for supervisory writs. The court of appeal
originally denied writs. However, the Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari, United Servs.
Auto. Ass'n v. Dugas, 582 So. 2d 847 (La. 1991), and remanded to the court of appeal for briefing,
argument, and opinion. On remand, the court of appeal held:
[Tihe insurer can recover the overpayment because the contract is the law between the
parties. The provision of that contract relating to underinsured motorist coverage requires
the insurer to pay only the uninsured portion of the actual damages, and we interpret this
to mean damages judicially determined, in this case by a jury, just as the liability
provisions mean an insurer is liable to third parties only for judicially determined
damages.
Dugas, 593 So. 2d at 920.
70. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Azhar, 620 So. 2d 1158. 1158-59 (La. 1993);
Pitard v. Davis, 599 So. 2d 398, 405 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1992).
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opined: "[T]he majority decision place[d] a 'condition' on the 'unconditional'
payment pursuant to LSA-R.S. 22:658.""7
The final case in the trilogy addressing this issue prior to Azhar was Pitard
v. Davis.72  Multiple parties7" were involved in the litigation; however, the
71. In its entirety, the dissent stated:
I respectfully dissent. The majority decision places a "condition" on the "unconditional"
payment pursuant to LSA-R.S. 22:658. The net effect of the decision is that a payment
under LSA-R.S. 22:658 must now be held in escrow until the rendition of the final
judgment to determine what, if any, portion of the payment is subject to a refund to the
insurance company.
The payment under LSA-R.S. 22:658 was made for the sole purpose of avoiding the
imposition of attorney's fees. This is what the insurance company received for its
payment. Penalties and attorney's fees would not be imposed in this case because the
payment was greater than the final judgment and if the final judgment had been
$200,000.00 the insurance company would have argued against the imposition of penalties
and attorney's fees on the judgment in excess of its payment on the basis that its payment
was not arbitrary, capricious or without probable cause.
If the legislature had intended for the "unconditional" payment under LSA-R.S. 22:658
to be subject to the "condition" set forth in the majority opinion, it could easily have
included such a "condition" in the statute. It is submitted that such a provision was not
inserted because it would have destroyed the very purpose for the enactment of the
statute-to insure the timely payment by the insurance company of the portion of the
claim which is due so the insured could immediately use the funds to alleviate the
damages suffered.
Dugas, 593 So. 2d at 922 (Hufft, J. Pro Tem., dissenting).
Justice Pro Tempore Hufft implies that the legal mandate to return a payment that was determined
"not due" is a condition imposed by the insurer upon the insured. As discussed infra at notes 87-92
and accompanying text, the Louisiana Civil Code articles mandating repayment should not be
considered a condition, as used in an "unconditional" tender.
Additionally, Justice Pro Tempore Hufft declared. "The payment tinder LSA-R.S. 22:658 was made
for the sole purpose of avoiding the imposition of penalties and attorney's fees. This is what the
insurance company received for its payment." li. Actually, it is only a payment of a thing due that
avoids attorney's fees; if an amount is not dte, attorney's fees cannot be imposed. For example:
An insurer makes an unconditional tender of $5.000 to an insured. If the insured then proceeds with
an action against the insurer to have the damages judicially determined, and damages due are found
to be $5,000, no penalties or attorney's fees would be awarded because the insurer did not act
arbitrarily or capriciously in tendering $5,000. If the insurer had not made a tender, attorney's fees
would be justified if the insurer had acted arbitrarily or capriciously. If the judicially determined
damages due were $0, regardless of whether any amount is tendered, no penalties or attorney's fees
will be imposed because the insurer's actions can not be deemed arbitrary and capricious. In Azhar,
because a jury determined no additional damages were due. no penalties or attorney's fees could be
imposed. Thus, State Farm did not pay for the purpose of avoiding attorney's fees.
72. 599 So. 2d 398 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1992) (ruling on this issue just eighteen days after the
writ was denied on the fourth circuit's opinion in Dugas).
73. These parties included: Andree Pitard (passenger in James Hailey's vehicle) against Joe
Davis (driver of the vehicle that rear-ended the vehicle in which Pitard was a passenger), Harvey
Melville d/b/a Red Top Seafood (Davis' employer), Trinity Universal Insurance Company (Melville's
insurer), James W. Hailey (driver of the vehicle in which Pitard rode as a passenger). United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Company (Hailey's liability and underinsured motorist carrier), and State Farm
and Liberty Mutual Insurance Companies, two additional underinsured motorist carriers. Id. at 399-
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pertinent parties were Pitard, Hailey, and United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Company (hereinafter USF&G). The court dismissed Hailey, the host driver
defendant, from the suit. USF&G, Hailey's underinsured motorist carrier,
tendered $50,000 of its $250,000 underinsured motorist limit to Pitard. 4 Pitard
also signed a written release of the other parties, excluding the two additional
underinsured motorist insurers.75 USF&G reconvened against Pitard seeking a
refund of the $50,000 tender.76 The jury found Davis negligent and awarded
damages of $95,800 to Pitard.77 The trial judge dismissed USF&G's reconven-
tional demand and also awarded additional medical expenses, as stipulated by
counsel, amounting to $13,500. The total damages awarded were $109,300.78
Because the total damages did not exceed the $140,000 Pitard had already
received, $90,000 from liability insurance and $50,000 from USF&G, Pitard's
suit was dismissed.79 USF&G, relying on Dugas, argued that it was entitled to
a refund of $22,208.80 The Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal declined to
follow the majority's analysis in Dugas.8' Instead, it adopted the reasoning of
Justice Pro Tempore Hufft's dissent, holding the insurer was not entitled to
reimbursement of the payment made to the insured.8 -
These diverse opinions demonstrate the obvious difficulty Louisiana courts
faced in analyzing the statutes and available jurisprudence. One such difficulty
each court had to ultimately address was the unconditional tender. An
examination of the analysis used by Dugas, Gallagher, and Pitard to define the
unconditional tender may provide a more complete understanding of the term.
The holding of McDiU is often repeated:8 "- the failure of the insurer to pay
an "amount [that] would be unconditionally tendered to the plaintiff not in
settlement of the case, but to show their good faith in the matter and to comply
with the duties imposed upon them under their contract of insurance with the
400.
74. Id. at 400.
75. Id.
76. Id.




80. "USF & G asserts its UM coverage did not take effect until Trinity's $90,000.00 payment
was exhausted; thus, under the judgment lof $109,300 in damagesl USF & G was liable only for
$19,300.00 with interest of $8,492.00. USF & G argues its total liability was $27,792.00. It paid
$50,000.00. It contends it is due a refund of $22,208.00." kd at 404.
81. Id. at 405.
82. Id. at 403.
83. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Azhar, 620 So. 2d 1158 (La. 1993); United Servs. Auto.
Ass'n v. Dugas. 593 So. 2d 918 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 596 So. 2d 210 (1992); Pitard v.
Davis, 599 So. 2d 398 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1992); Wambsgans v. Liberty Lloyds Ins. Co., 595 So. 2d
719 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1992). Support is also found in federal courts. Gallagher v. State Farm Ins.
Co., 760 F. Supp. 562 (E.D. La. 1991).
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insured' ' 4 may be the basis for imposition of penalties and attorney's fees. The
court in Dugas correctly identified the relationship of the unconditional tender
and Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:658:
[T]he McDill requirement for an "unconditional tender" does not create
an obligation separate from the insurance contract. On the contrary,
McDill emphasizes the insurance contract, explaining that La.R.S.
22:658 is a mechanism for enforcing existing contractual obligations
between insurer and insured. Further, McDill says that this uncondition-
al tender merely shows the insurer's acknowledgement of "the duties
imposed upon them under their contract of insurance with the insured."
From this we conclude that neither La.R.S. 22:658 nor the jurisprudence
contemplates that an unconditional tender is a separate obligation that
displaces an insurer's contractual obligation.8
The courts generally find an act by the insurer, such as requiring settlement
of a claim" or a proof of loss admitting the tendered amount is the extent of
damages, 7 is the cause of a tender being found unconditional. "Condition" is
not defined in the Civil Code,8 8 nor did the reporter choose to define the term
in the comments of any article because "the word can be used in a variety of
contexts and be vested, therefore, with many different meanings." 89 In Azhar,
State Farm did not place any conditions on the tender, such as placing the
amount in escrow or requiring acknowledgement of settlement. Dr. Azhar was
free to use the tender as he saw fit. The "condition" requiring a return of the
tender to the insurer, as Justice Pro Tcmpore Hufft labeled it in Dugas, is
actually imposed by Civil Code articles 2301-2313. Justice Pro Tempore Hufft's
analysis is bootstrapping. The articles should not be considered a condition. The
intent of an unconditional tender and hence, a determination of what is
unconditional, should only be evaluated by actions of the insurer.
In Gallagher, the court interpreted "unconditional" as follows: "The tender
is unconditional because the plaintiff need not release his or her claims in return.
Just as the insured is not precluded by acceptance of the tender from seeking
more, the insurer may not be precluded from arguing that its tender was too
84. McDill v. Utica Mll. Ins. Co.. 475 So. 2d 1085, 1091-92 (La. 1985).
85. Dugas. 593 So. 2d at 921.
86. Landry v. State Farm Ins. Co., 529 So. 2d 417, 426 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1988); Jackson v.
Security Indus. Ins. Co., 484 So. 2d 966, 969, (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986); O'Brian v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
420 So. 2d 1222, 1226 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982); Riverland Oil Mill. Inc. v. Underwriters for Lloyd's,
368 So. 2d 156. 164 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979): Witherwax v. Zurich Ins. Co., 315 So. 2d 420, 426
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1975); Spano v. Einmco Ins. Co.. 239 So. 2d 434, 437 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ
refused, 241 So. 2d 530 (1970).
87. Sibley v. Insured Lloyds, 442 So. 2d 627, 632 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1983).




generous." 9 Judge Sear further stated in Gallagher, "[a] tender under McDill
does not negate whatever right to recover an insurer may have against its insured
for mistaken or excessive payments." 9' The court in Dugas also reasoned there
was more to defining "unconditional" than to state that a condition is placed on
an unconditional tender. "Unconditional," the Dugas majority stated, "does not
mean 'final' or 'conclusive' as if ending the litigation. It is not an accord and
satisfaction, compromise or settlement.
92
Finally, Justice Pro Tempore Hufft, in the Dugas dissent, bases the definition
of unconditional on the ease with which the legislature could have included such
a condition in the statute. This analysis begs the question of why, if the word
"unconditional" is not found in Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:658, the legislature
would suspect a qualifier of unconditional was necessary? As discussed earlier
in this paper, the courts, not the legislature, have transformed "unconditional"'
into a term of art relating to the insurer's duties to the insured.
D. Insured's Right of Payment. is Determined Under Its Contractual
Agreement
Claims for uninsured motorist benefits are simply claims made under an
insurance contract. Thus, contract law determines the rights and obligations of
the parties.9" To enforce the contract, the insured must demonstrate his legal
entitlement to the alleged damages from the tortfeasor under tort law. State
Farm's insurance contract with Dr. Azhar defined its obligation to pay uninsured
claims as follows: "We will pay damages for bodily injury the insured is legally
entitled to collect from the owner or driver of an uninsured motor vehicle."
'9
By requiring the insured to be "legally entitled to collect," State Farm clearly
intended to insure only those uninsured motorist claims that were recoverable
90. Gallagher v. State Farm Ins. Co., 760 F. Supp. 562, 564 (E.D. La. 1991).
91. Id. (citing, additionally, La. Civ. Code arts. 2301, 2302, and cases thereunder) (footnotes
omitted).
92. United Scrvs. Auto Ass'n v. Dugas, 593 So. 2d 918, 921 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied,
596 So. 2d 210 (1992) (citing Johnson v. Protective Casualty Ins. Co.. 577 So. 2d 355, 357 (La. App.
Ist Cir. 1990)). The court further stated:
We believe unconditional means just that: an insurer cannot condition its tender. As an
example, an insurer cannot place conditions on its tender by requiring a release, or by
demanding that the funds be placed in escrow, or by limiting their use to payment of
medical bills. The tender is unconditional in the sense the insured can use it as his own,
but it is not conclusively his until a judge or jury says that it is his as the amount due for
underinsured damages.
Id.
93. See Hemel v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 211 La. 95, 29 So. 2d 483 (1947); Kellams
v. Oliver, 595 So. 2d 331 (La. App. 3d Cir.), witil denied, 596 So. 2d 556 (La. 1992).
94. Brief for Respondent at 3, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Azhar, 620 So. 2d 1158 (La.
1993) (93-CC-0556) (emphasis in original).
17571994]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
under theories of tort law.9 The Louisiana Supreme Court's adoption of this
concept is recognized in Hart v. Allstate hIsurance Co.
96
Chief Justice Calogero, author of the dissent in Azhar, previously explained
in Nienmann v. Trav'elers Insurance Co.9 ' why the determination of tort liability
is so vital to UM disputes. The UM insurer has no obligation to pay damages
that do not exceed the tortfeasor's liability limits.9' Therefore, the obligation
does not exist until the tortfeasor's liability limits are exceeded by damages. This
reference to the "obligation" of the insurer also illuminates the importance of
understanding, under civilian theory, how an insurer's obligation arises.
Professor Alain A. Levasseur99 expounds on the analysis used to determine
the kind of obligation, if any, created under the Louisiana Civil Code in his
prdcis.' °° Professor Levasseur refers to the legal effects created by an insur-
ance contract in the section concerning suspensive and resolutory conditions. ' '
95. Paul W. Pretzel. Uninsured Motorists § 17.2 (1972) ("That is. if the insured could not,
under the law of torts, 'legally' recover from the uninsured motorist, the company is not liable under
the UM portions of the policy."), Alan 1. Widiss, Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Insurance
§ 39.1 (2d ed. 1985) ("fTIhe critical inquiry is whether the indemnification sought by a claimant is
for damages which could have been recovered in a tort suit resulting from such an accident.").
96. 437 So. 2d 823. 828 (La. 1983). The supreme court approvingly cites Breaux v.
Government Employee Ins. Co., 369 So. 2d 1335. 1338 (La. 1979) ("A person insured under the
uninsured motorist provision of a particular policy must establish that he is 'legally entitled to
recover' damages fron the owner or operator of an uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle in order
to obtain coverage thereunder."), and Booth v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.. 253 La. 521, 529, 218 So.
2d 580, 583 (1969) ("The words 'legally entitled to recover' mean simply that the plaintiff must be
able to establish fault on the part of the uninsured motorist which gives rise to damages and prove
the extent of those damages.").
97. 368 So. 2d 1003 (La. 1979).
98. Id. at 1007 n.6. Footnote 6 provides:
The 1974 amendment of R.S. 22:1406 D in effect makes UM coverage "excess" coverage.
The UM carrier has no obligation to pay that portion of plaintifr's damages within the
underinsured tortfeasor's liability policy limits but only those damages which exceed the
policy limits and which are within the UM policy limits; thus. tninsturcd motorist insurer's
only right to reimbursement in event of payment is with respect to recovery of that part
of insured's claim which exceeds the tortfeasor's liability policy limits, a sum as to which
only the torifeasor is exposed.
(citation omitted).
99. Professor of Law; Associate Director, Center of Civil Law Studies, Louisiana State
University.
100. Levasseur, supra note 88.
101. An obligation is subjected to a suspensive condition when it niua
, 
not be enforced until
the uncertain event occurs (LSA .C.C Art. 1767). Although this description of the effects
of a suspensive condition states that the obligation ny *tY not be enforced, actuially a
stspensive condition has a much more drastic effect: it sitspends the existence of the
obligation between the parties until the uncertain event occurs and. therefore, suspends the
enforcement of that same obligation. Although the bond of law has been formed, no
obligation is yet in existence. Such is the case. for example. of an insurance contract on
a home for protection against fire. flooding or other disasters. The insurance company will
not be called upon to indemnify the home owner until the house has been damaged or
destroyed. There is no obligation in existence for the insurance company although the
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This same characterization applies to an underinsured motorist insurance contract.
A suspensive condition"0 2 exists, which is not fulfilled until an insured is
"legally entitled to recover," and the insured's damages exceed the limits of the
liability policy of the underinsured molorist/tortfeasor.
As long as the occurrence of the uncertain event has not taken place,
and for whatever length of time its fulfillment is pending, the suspen-
sive condition prevents the rights and obligations of the parties from
coming into existence. Although a juridical act has been formed, as
illustrated in [Louisiana Civil Code articles] 1771 and 1775, that
juridical act is, to a large extent, without any effect. The parties must
wait for their rights and obligations to be born, if and when the
condition is fulfilled. 0 3
Professor Levasseur proceeds, using Louisiana Civil Code articles 2301-2313 as
his source of authority, to state, "should the debtor-obligor ever perform before
the fulfillment of the condition, he must be entitled to claim his performance
back on the ground that he made a payment of a thing not due."' State
Farm's payment was made before the jury determined Dr. Azhar's damages did
not exceed the amount of liability coverage carried by Ms. Holmes.
E. Payment of a Thing Not Due
The ability of a party to recover the payment of a thing not due (condictio
indebiti) is set forth in Louisiana Civil Code articles 2301-2313.t"' Therefore,
because Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:658 does not expressly or implicitly
deprive an insurer of the right to recover undue payments, and the Insurance
Code fails to address this issue, the Civil Code should apply.' °6 State Farm
insurance contract has been entered into.
Id. at 61 (third emphasis added).
102. "As a modality or component part of an obligation, a condition must be understood as an
event which may or may not occur and to which is tied the existence or the extinction of a bond of
law. Thus, a conditional obligation is one whose fate is indefinite." Ud at 58.
103. Id. at 75.
104. Id. at 76.
105. La. Civ. Code art. 2301 provides: "He who receives what is not due to him, whether he
receives it through error or knowingly, obliges himself to restore it to him from whom he has unduly
received it." La. Civ. Code art. 2302 provides: "He who has paid through mistake, believing himself
a debtor, may reclaim what he has paid." La. Civ. Code art. 2304 provides: "A thing not due is that
which is paid on the supposition of an obligation which did not exist, or from which a person has
been released." La. Civ. Code art. 2308 provides: "It is considered that a thing has been paid, when
not due, if the payment was made by virtue of an agreeent, the effect of which is suspended by a
condition, the event of which is uncertain." La. Civ. Code art. 2309 provides: "This principle must
not be extended to things due on a day certain, nor to conditions which must certainly happen."
106. A general statute, such as a civil code article. applies when the specific statute (sui generis).




paid the $35,000 by mistake, believing, based on the facts before fault was
judicially determined, that it was obligated to tender this amount to Dr. Azhar.
After the jury determination of damages, the obligation, in fact, did not exist
because damages did not exceed the tortfeasor's liability coverage. Thus, State
Farm paid on an obligation that did not exist.'0 7 Article 2302 provides:
He who has paid through mistake, believing himself a debtor, may
reclaim what he has paid.'0 8
Thus, it appears to directly address State Farm's situation. State Farm, believing
it was a debtor, tendered an undisputed amount. Subsequently, the court should
have determined this tender was not "due" from State Farm, and the tender
should have been recovered. Louisiana jurisprudence has repeatedly recognized
an insurer's right to recover an overpayment made to the insured.' 9
In an analogous case not involving an insurance company, but still pertinent
to the facts of Azhar, a doctor, believing he was at fault, agreed, prior to trial,
to pay the city $50 per month for damage he caused to a utility pole during an
accident.' During the trial, the city was held responsible for the accident,
relieving the doctor of liability."' Consequently, the court determined the
doctor was entitled to recover a $50 payment that had already been made." 2
By analogy, this case stands for the proposition that State Farm has a cause of
action under Article 2302 to recover the $35,000 mistakenly paid. Otherwise,
the case is no longer a valid statement of the law. An insurance company should
be as entitled to the benefits of the Louisiana Civil Code as a private doctor.
Although, through Azhar, the supreme court implies that Article 2302 is not
applicable, Article 2304 provides still another basis for recovery of the tender.
Article 2304 provides:
107. This is implied from the nature of an obligation in an insurance contract. The obligation
did not exist until the suspensive condition, damages exceeding torifeasor's liability policy, was
fulfilled. Since damages only totaled S 14,300.00, and the tortfeasor's liability limits were $25,000.00,
the obligation could not have come into existence. See Niemann v. Travelers Ins. Co.. 368 So. 2d
1003, 1007 n.6 (La. 1979).
108. La. Civ. Code art. 2302.
109. Dear v. Blue Cross, 511 So. 2d 73 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987); Mathews v. Louisiana Health
Serv. & Ind. Co., 471 So. 2d 1199 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985): Shelter Ins. Co. v. Cruse, 446 So. 2d 893
(La. App. Ist Cir. 1984); DeVillier v. Highlands Ins. Co., 389 So. 2d 1133 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980);
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Melancon. 348 So. 2d 717 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1977); Great American
Indem. Co. v. DaLtzat, 157 So. 2d 308 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963); Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co.
v. Guzzardi, 144 So. 2d 556 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962). Central Sur. & Ins. Corp. v. Corbello. 74 So.
2d 341 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1954). Federal courts have also addressed this issue. Applying Louisiana
law, they have held the insurer was entitled to recover. Gallagher v. State Farm Ins. Co., 760 F.
Supp. 562 (E.D. La. 1991); Prudential Ins. Co. of An. v. Harris, 748 F. Stipp. 445 (M.D. La. 1990).
110. Tischler v. City of Alexandria. 471 So. 2d 1099 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985).




A thing not due is that which is paid on the supposition of an obligation
which did not exist, or from which a person has been released.' 13
By definition, a McDill unconditional tender is an insurer's good faith offer to
pay" 4 in order to comply with the duties imposed upon it by its contract of
insurance with the insured.'"' If "duties" is interpreted to imply something is
"due," then surely after the jury determination of damages and fault, State Farm
stated a cause of action under Article 2304 for "recovery of the payment" which
is subsequently undue. 116
The Azhar court appeared willing to follow the mandates of Articles 2301
and 2302, until it addressed Article 2308. Article 2308 provides:
It is considered that a thing has been paid, when not due, if the
payment was made by virtue of an agreement, the effect of which is
suspended by a condition, the event of which is uncertain." 7
The supreme court's interpretation of Article 2308 is unconventional. The
court's interpretation was as follows: "Under [Civil Code article] 2308, a
conditional payment, subject to an uncertain suspensive condition, is regarded as
payment of a thing not due. Under that Article, a conditional payment may be
reclaimed. The Article's converse implication is that an unconditional payment
may not be reclaimed.""'
The court's interpretation of Article 2308 is questionable. The phrase "the
effect of which" refers to the effect of the agreement as being the suspensive
condition, not the effect of thepayment. "Modifiers should come, if possible, next
to the word they modify." 9 Following this basic rule of grammar, the court
should have concluded that State Farm's payment, the unconditional tender, was
113. La. Civ. Code art. 2304.
114. McDill v. Utica MuL. Ins. Co.. 475 So. 2d 1085. 1092 n.5 (La. 1985).
115. Id. at 1092.
116. See Alain A. Levasseur, Louisiana Law of Unjust Enrichment in Quasi-Contracts 184-91
(1991). If determined that the tender is due, the obligation could then be characterized as being
subject to a resolutory condition. The same result would be reached. Upon the occurrence of the
resolutory condition, that being a finding that damages are less than the tortfeasor's liability coverage
limits, the parties are to be returned to the stots quo ate, their original position. Thus, the
obligation is treated as if it never occurred. Id. The tendered amount would be returned to the
insurer.
117. La. Civ. Code art. 2308.
118. State Fann Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Azhar. 620 So. 2d 1158, 1160 (La. 1993) (emphasis
added).
119. William Strunk. Jr. & E. B. White. The Elements of Style 30 (3d ed. 1979). Rule 20
provides:
The position of the words in a sentence is the principal means of showing their
relationship. Confision and ambiguity result when words are badly placed. The writer
must, therefore, bring together the words and groups of words that are related in thought




made by virtue of an agreement, the UM insurance policy. The policy's effect was
suspended on the condition Dr. Azhar's damages exceed the tortfeasor's $25,000
liability coverage. The occurrence of this event was uncertain, at least until a court
ruled on Dr. Azhar's damages and percentage of fault.
The caption, "Payment under agreement subject to uncertain suspensive
condition," above Article 2308 also supports this interpretation of the intent of the
article. 20 Article 2308 should not be applied to conditional or unconditional
payments. The court apparently was trying to construct an interpretation tailored
to support the desired result in this case.' 2'
The proper interpretation of Article 2308 was available in our jurisprudence.
Judge Culpepper's opinion in Whitehall Oil Co. v. Boagni'22 provides a guide to
interpreting Article 2308. The articles concerning payment of a thing not due
2 3
must be evaluated in pari materia. "The rationale of the articles is that, even
without an express agreement to that effect, every payment presupposes a debt.
Consequently, if a thing has been paid without it being due, it can be recov-
ered."'1
24
Boagni analyzes "repetition," the French action to recover payment of a thing
not due. Repetition could be exercised in three different situations: (1) when there
was no obligation; (2) when the payment resulted from an obligation that has
ceased to exist; and (3) where the obligation's cause was immoral or illicit. 2
120. This is not to say a heading is considered "law." The author intends only to point out that
the heading is generally used to give the reader an overview of the statute's content. Following this
assumption, the article's caption indicates that "subject to uncertain suspensive condition" modifies
"agreement." If "Payment" was to be modilied, "under agreement" would have been eliminated or
offset with commas.
121. At the end of its opinion, the Azhar court appeared to be uncertain of its analysis, while
maintaining certainty as to the desired outcome. The court determined that "State Farm's assessment
of Azhar's claim was above that of the jury and represented a possible error in judgment. On the
other hand, the jury may have erred. Regardles. State Farm evaluated the claim and made an
unconditional payment to its insured, which cannot be recovered." Azhar, 620 So. 2d at 1160
(emphasis added).
The court recognizes State Farm's possible error. The court then appears to shift its focus from
State Farm by stating the jury may have erred. The proverbial phrase "two wrongs do not make a
right" immediately comes to mind. There is always a possibility of jury error. But a jury
determination should be assumed correct, unless facts indicate otherwise. The court's use of
"regardless" appears to indicate that in spite of confusion elsewhere, the court was certain as to the
outcome desired.
122. 217 So. 2d 707 (La. App. 3d Cir.), ajfd, 255 La. 67, 229 So. 2d 702 (1969).
123. La. Civ. Code arts. 2301-2313.
124. Boagni, 217 So. 2d at 709 (footnote omitted).
125. Repetition always presupposes that what was paid was not due, but in order to
determine precisely the conditions ttnder which repetition can be exercised, it is necessary
to distinguish between three different situations: (1) where there was no obligation whatever
between the payer and the payee: (2) where tie payment was made in view of an actual
obligation which has since ceased to exist; and (3) where the obligation paid had an illicit
or an immoral cause.
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"Planiol takes the position that error by the payer is required in situation (1) listed
above, but not in situations (2) and (3)." '126
The third circuit in Boagni noted Planiol's discussion concerning Code
Napoleon article 1376, which is almost identical to Louisiana Civil Code article
2301. '27 Neither of these two articles further defines "of a thing not due," nor
expressly provides for recovery of a payment made in error.'28 Louisiana Civil
Code articles 2302 through 2309, which have no corresponding source articles
in the Code Napoleon, serve the purpose of "expressly allow[ing] recovery where
there is error on the part of the person making the payment and to further define
'a thing not due'."129
Article 2304 provides:
A thing not due is that which is paid on the supposition of an obligation
which did not exist, or from which a person has been released.'30
The article provides for two separate situations: first, when a person pays
through error a debt which actually does not exist at the time of payment131
Second, where the actual obligation exists at the time of payment, but the debt
is later released. 3 2 "Although Article 2304 does not expressly [state] that in
this situation error on the part of the payer [the UM insurer] is not required, [the
court believed] this [was] necessarily implied."' 33  The court then stated,
"[Louisiana Civil Code article] 2308 affords similar relief where the condition
Id. at 710 (citing 2 Marcel Planiol. Treatise on the Civil Law, pt. I. § 837 (Louisiana State Law
Institute trans.. 12th cd. 1959)).
126. It is required that there be something not due: the plaintiff in repetition must prove
that his debt was resolved or annulled. or that the future debt did not arise- but the
condition of error is not required, and it cannot be exacted. There is an act other than
payment, and that is the annulment, the resolution or failure of a condition, which renders
necessary the reestablishment of things in the state they would have been in if the
agreement had not been made [stants quo antel.
Id. (citing Planiol, supra note 125, § 843. at 452) (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 710.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. La. Civ. Code art. 2304.
131. As discussed earlier, the obligation to pay the insured may not have arisen until Dr. Azhar's
damages exceeded Ms. Holmes' liability coverage limits. This is. in effect, very similar to the result
that would have been reached under Article 2302.
132. This situation may apply if the statutory language of La. R.S. 22:658. to "pay the amount
of any claim due." is interpreted as creating an obligation. The obligation could be subsequently
released upon a jury finding of an overpayment of damages to the insured.
133. Whitehall Oil Co. v. Boagni. 217 So. 2d. 707, 710 (La. App. 3d Cir.), aft'd, 255 La. 67,
229 So. 2d 702 (1969).
For, if there is an actual legal obligation at the time of the payment, it cannot be made
through mistake. As Planiol says, in Vol. 2. Part I. Sec. 843 .... there is an act which
takes the place of the payment through error, and that is the subsequent resolution or
failure of the contract. Under our Code. this would be a resolutory condition.
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is suspensive."''34 Therefore, Article 2308 was, arguably, included in the Civil
Code to address the situation when a suspensive condition is not fulfilled and
causes the failure of the contract/obligation.
Judge Culpepper's clear and thorough analysis guides one to the proper
interpretation, and additional Louisiana courts have also found the same
interpretation of Article 2308."'j
F. Tender is Not A Compromise
The unconditional tender is not a compromise. 3 6 The benefit of this legal
theory is the finality it affords. In situations involving the unconditional tender,
the insured is not prevented from seeking additional damages. In a vast majority
of cases, the unconditional tender acts as a final adjustment of the case merely
because the insured is satisfied with the amount of compensation he receives.
The insurer cannot ask for a release pursuant to the tender, because as discussed
earlier,137 the tender would be conditional and expose the insurer to penalties
and attorney's fees. The unilateral tender should not be treated as a compromise
because the insured, by accepting the tender, does not concede the differences
between the parties. 3' Pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code article 3071, 39 a
compromise agreement needs no cause or consideration other than adjustment of
differences and a desire to put at rest all possibility of future litigation.40
Thus, the lack of the adjustment of differences from the insured's perspective
reflects the lack of a compromise. In a settlement situation, both parties receive
134. id at 711 n.6 (emphasis added). See also Articles 2021, 2023, 2042, and 2045 on
suspensive and resolutory conditions.
135. Succession of Miller v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 110 La. 652, 658. 34 So. 723, 725 (1903)
("[Tlhe Code is express that what is due under a suspensive condition, dependent upon an uncertain
event, is not due, and cannot form the consideration of a payment."), Penny v. Spender Business
College, 85 So. 2d 365, 367 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956) ("The condition which will suspend the effect
of an agreement referred to in article 2308 is what is generally referred to as ... a condition.
precedent ....").
136. McDill stated it was not an accord and satisfaction either.
137. See suqra note 92 and accompanying text.
138. Rivett v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.. 508 So. 2d 1356 (La. 1987).
139. A transaction or compromise is an agreement between two or more persons, who, for
preventing or putting an end to a lawsuit, adjust their differences by mutual consent, in the
manner which they agree on. and which every one of them prefers to hope of gaining,
balanced by the danger of losing.
This contract must be either reduced into writing or recited in open court and capable
of being transcribed from the record of the proceeding. The agreement recited in open
court confers upon each of them the right of judicially enforcing its performance, although
its substance may thereafter be written in a more convenient form.
La. Civ. Code an. 3071.
140. Domier v. Live Oak Arabians. Inc.. 602 So. 2d 743 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writ denied. 608
So. 2d 177 (1992).
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the benefit or detriment of the bargain. The McDill tender, however, does not
settle the litigation; it merely indicates good faith.
Pattison v. Valley Forge Insurance Co.' 41 provides another example of
strategies used by courts to further avoid the Azhar situation. In Pattison, the
insurer unconditionally tendered $40,000 to the insured. The insured, seeking
higher damages, continued the litigation against the insurance company. The
jury determined that the $40,000 tender was adequate to compensate the insured
and awarded no additional damages, thus avoiding the issue of a payment of a
thing not due. Pattison does not address the injustice imposed on an insurer if
damages do not exceed the limits of the tortfeasor's liability coverage. But, it
does not attempt to rub salt into the wounds of the insurer by acknowledging an
overpayment was made and not allowing the proper codal remedy.
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
A. Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Coverage was Created for a Specific
Purpose
The legislature created uninsured/underinsured motorist insurance coverage
to provide to the innocent victim a source of restitution when damages suffered
by the victim could not be recovered from the tortfeasor.'4 2 The legislature
wanted to protect the innocent victims from bearing the burden of irresponsible
tortfeasors who either failed to carry liability insurance or carried an inadequate
amount. However, uninsured/underinsured coverage was not designed to allow
parties injured in accidents to recover monetary payments in excess of their
actual damages. This is arguably implied in UM coverage being considered
excess coverage. 43 Excess, by common definition, means an amount that
surpasses. Therefore, UM coverage was to pick up where the tortfeasor's
liability policy left off. There should not be an overlap that results in double
recovery.
Uninsured/underinsured insurance is intended to "make up the difference"
in coverage. A simple examination of the words used to identify the coverage
illustrates this point. "Un," when used in adjectives or nouns, means "not."1 44
"Under" is defined as "falling short of a standard or required degree.' 4 Thus,
uninsured is simply not insured; likewise, underinsured is insurance that falls
short of the required degree or anount needed. Neither form of insurance
should have been applicable in Azhar because the tortfeasor's liability insurance
covered Dr. Azhar's judicially determined damages. It is inherently unfair to
require an insurance company to pay claims, under an uninsured or underinsured
141. 599 So. 2d 873 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 604 So. 2d 1001 (1992).
142. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
143. 8C John A. Appleman & Jean Applenan. Insurance Law and Practice § 5071.35 (1981).




policy, in contravention of the actual policy language. Dr. Azhar's underinsured
policy was only to be effective if he suffered damages that were not reimbursed
by the tortfeasor or the torifeasor's insurer. Dr. Azhar was fully compensated
for all judicially determined damages; in fact, his settlement with Ms. Holmes'
insurer resulted in Dr. Azhar receiving $10,700 above his actual damages.
The Azhar court suggested the jury could have erred in determining the
proper amount of damages to award Dr. Azhar.146 The court uses the possible
error to justify allowing Dr. Azhar to keep the tendered amount. The court
would not be as willing to resort to the same rationale if the roles were reversed.
If Dr. Azhar had received from State Farm an amount less than the damages a
jury determined were owed him, it is unlikely the court would have stated "the
jury could have erred" 147 and, thus, no modification of either party's status was
required.
There is a potential for error in any suit. Is it not true that any judge or jury
is susceptible to human error? But this slight possibility should not inure to the
benefit of only uninsured motorist victims. If the courts are unwilling to account
for jury error in all cases, no one should be allowed to receive the benefit of the
judge's doubt of the jury's decision.
The courts should not treat an insurance company differently merely because
it is larger and better able to absorb a loss. Both parties should receive what was
bargained for in their contract. State Farm fulfilled the McDill requirement, a
good faith effort to comply with the terms of the contract, by making its tender
to Dr. Azhar. However, in Dr. Azhar's evaluation of the claim, he believed his
contract of insurance with State Farm entitled him to a larger payment. State
Farm's error in assessing the extent of Dr. Azhar's damages would have gone
unnoticed were it not for Dr. Azhar's error in his assessment of the damages.
Additionally, Dr. Azhar's error resulted in increased litigation costs for State
Farm, and possibly for himself, depending on the arrangement with his counsel.
Yet, State Farm was held responsible for both its own and Dr. Azhar's error.
The Legislature's intent when creating uninsured/underinsured motorist
coverage in Louisiana was to allow full recovery for damages suffered by the
innocent victim. 1 48 Dr. Azhar chose to have an impartial jury determine the
extent of his damages, instead of accepting State Farm's assessment. 49 Dr.
Azhar obviously believed he was contractually entitled to a larger payment.
State Farm should likewise be able to rely on its contract. State Farm did not
receive its contractual benefits from the results reached in Azhar.
146. State Farn Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Azhar, 620 So. 2d 1158, 1160 (La. 1993).
147. Id.
148. See sqra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
149. Insurers may not look at the good faith tender as having no effect. The insurer may include
a portion of anticipated legal costs in determining what an individual claim is worth. The insurer
hopes the tender has the effect of ending litigation, though requiring this would make the tender
unconditional. But, if the insured fails to accept the tender as an end to litigation, the insured should
not be able to continue without risk.
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B. The Insured's Risk is Small in Further Litigation
The supreme court's holding in Azhar puts the insured, who has received a
McDill tender, in an enviable position. The insured has a non-refundable minimum
payment which he may choose to keep and forego future litigation; or, he may
pursue greater rewards through the judicial system by continuing litigation against
the insurer, while risking only the difference of the insured's attorney's contingency
fee, if anything at all. The insured who receives a tender before hiring an attorney
risks nothing because the attorney will only collect on his contingency fee if an
additional amount is awarded to the insured in subsequent litigation against the
insurer.
The insured, having little to lose, is encouraged to pursue all potential actions
against the insurer, which opens the floodgates of litigation. As Chief Justice
Calogero correctly pointed out in his Azhar dissent, "since an insured can seek
more money, even after the tender, fairness dictates that the law operate for a
defendant as well as a plaintiff, and permit a defendant to seek restoration or
reimbursement of an excessive payment."
Larger tenders to innocent victims might result from allowing an insurer to
recover excessive payments. Insurers' assessments will include the value of no
future litigation. If the insurer knows the insured risks having to return what ajury
determines is in excess of the insured's actual damages, increased tenders,
intending to end litigation, would be more common. Both parties, insureds and
insurers, would benefit from allowing recovery of the excess tender.
Additionally, without the benefit of a full judicial hearing, insurers are unable
to determine the true facts surrounding the accident. If excessive payments are
recoverable, insurers are more likely to view alleged factual circumstances in favor
of the injured insured, resulting in higher tenders.
Finally, it cannot be overemphasized that the insured controls whether to
pursue future litigation. This note suggests that the insurer cannot seek a return of
the tender until after the insured chooses to pursue litigation, and a court or jury
determines actual damages. Risk is then equalized for both parties. Each will be
expected to abide by the jury's determination, and adjust previous compensation,
either way, to ensure the insured isftirly compensated.
. Insurance Companies Will Reduce Amount Tendered in the Future
In Dugas, Justice Pro Tempore Hufft clearly articulated the purpose of
Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:658-"to insure the timely payment by the insurance
company of the portion of the claim which is due so the insured could immediately
150. State Farm Mitt. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Azhar. 620 So. 2d 1158, 1160 (La. 1993) (Calogero. C.J.,
dissenting) (citing United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Dugas. 593 So. 2d 918, 921 (La. App. 4th Cir.). writ
dentied, 596 So. 2d 210 (1992)).
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use the funds to alleviate the damages suffered."' 5' Not allowing recovery of an
excessive McDill tender would frustrate that purpose. As Chief Justice Calogero
pointed out, "The result of [Azhar] will be to discourage UM insurance carriers
from making early, substantial tenders. The fear of making irrevocable, larger than
necessary payments will bring this about."' 5 2 It thus appears, regardless of the
theory adopted, the purpose of the statute may be adversely affected.
On the other hand, allowing insurers to recover an undue payment will
encourage insurers to make fair estimates, which the insured is free to use as he
determines. The Azhar decision encourages insurers to scrutinize more closely the
insured's presentation of the facts. This higher scrutiny would not be necessary if
the insurers could rely on their tender being returned upon a finding that the
original alleged facts did not justify the amount the insurer was required to tender.
The insured risks return of an excess tender only if he chooses to seek more
damages and, subsequently, requests this amount be judicially determined. Equity
requires, under the contract '- 3 between the insured and insurer,'5 4 that the
insured receive no more than he contracted for if he chose continued litigation.
Otherwise, the insured is simply gambling with someone else's money.
Forcing the insurers to scrutinize each tender'55 will again increase the
number of litigants needing the assistance of the courts. Because tenders will be
lower, the insured will be forced to turn to the courts more frequently to calculate
the exact damages, which the insurer is unwilling, and usually unable, to
determine.
VI. CONCLUSION
The unconditional tender requirement, developed in McDill, became a basis for
an inherently unfair decision in Azhar. The holding in Azhar reflects a need for
corrective action by the Legislature. The civilian theory in Louisiana clearly
151. Dugas, 593 So. 2d at 922-23 (Hufft, J. Pro Tern., dissenting).
152. Azhar, 620 So. 2d at 1160 (Calogero. C.J.. dissenting).
153. La. Civ. Code art. 2054 provides:
When the parties made no provision for a particular situation, it must be assumed that
they intended to bind themselves not only to the express provisions of the contract, but
also to whatever the law, equity, or usage regards as implied in a contract of that kind or
necessary for the contract to achieve its purpose.
154. La. Civ. Code art. 2055 provides: "Equity ... is based on the principles that no one is
allowed to take unfair advantage of another ... 
155. Though the insurer should "scrutinize" any claim, the evaluation would likely result in
fewer "bare minimum" tenders if the insurer was entitled to recover any excess amount, after a
judicial determination, that resulted from an insured's pursuance of the litigation.
156. See McKenzie & Johnson. sulpra note 40, § 130. at 274.
Claims under UM coverage are first-party claims between an insured and his own insurer
which apparently are governed by the penalty provisions of LSA-R.S. 22:658. However,
these claims are unique because liability of the insurer is predicated upon the liability of
a third party. Furthermore. fixing of the amount of the claim is difficult because of the
uncertainty involved in measuring general damages for personal injuries.
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recognizes legislation and custom as the only primary sources of law. 57
Jurisprudence, doctrine, conventional usages, and equity are persuasive or
secondary sources of law.' Jurisprudential rules regarding unconditional
tenders, and methods for incorporating these rules into the insurance code, created
confusion, not solutions. The Louisiana Supreme Court in Azhar clearly defined
the rights of an insurance company to recover its unconditional tender-there is no
right of recovery absent fraud or ill practices. It seems ironic that uninsured/under-
insured motorist coverage, which was suggested by the insurance industry to
correct an injustice to injured insureds who responsibly obtained liability coverage,
but were injured by an irresponsible party, is now being used to perpetuate an
injustice against insurers who responsibly comply with the requirement of McDill.
The Azhar court seems to have overlooked the original intent of unin-
sured/underinsured coverage, to place the innocent victim in the same position he
would have been in had the tortfeasor carried adequate liability coverage. The
judicial system should not, by bootstrappingjurisprudence, develop law unprovided
by statute. The Legislature should now correct this wrong by providing statutorily
for recoverability of the tender.
A suggested statutory remedy is the passage of Louisiana Revised Statutes
22:658(E) to provide:
If an insurer unconditionally tenders payment to the insured and
subsequently the amount due under the policy is determined in an action
between the insurer and the insured to be less than the amount tendered,
the insurer shall be entitled to reimbursement from the insured of the
amount by which the unconditional tender exceeded the amountjudicially
determined to be due under the policy.
James Thomas Rivera*
157. La. Civ. Code art. 1.
158. See A.N. Yiannopoulos, Louisiana Civil Law System §§ 31-32 (1977).
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